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By Jill R. Horwitz
The jollowin9 is based on testimony delivered before the
U.S. House

if Representatives Committee on Ways and Means
on May 26, 2005

r. Chairman, in its review of the tax-exempt sector,
this committee has heard many distinguished witnesses
discuss the legal requirements governing nonprofit organizations,
the advantages that come with nonprofit status, and whether
nonprofit organizations provide sufficient public benefits to justify
these advantages. These are particularly important questions for
the hospital industry, where for -profit, nonprofit, and government
hospitals operate side by side.
I will discuss two questions about the implications of the
mix of hospital types: First, do different types of hospitals act
differently? Second, are there significant competitive issues raised
by having different hospital types competing in the same market
together?

M

Medical service provision
Underlying many of the policy questions about the legal
treatment of nonprofit hospitals is one basic issue: Do they act the
same as for -profit hospitals - and if not, what are the differences
and are they big enough to matter?
There are good reasons to expect hospitals of different
ownership status to act alike. They all share common goals of
treating sick people; they all employ large numbers of doctors and
nurses, using medical technology; they contract with the same
employers and insurance companies, and are subject to the same
health care regulations. Superficially, they resemble each other so
much that a patient admitted to a hospital is unlikely to be able to
tell whether it is a for -profit or a nonprofit.
However, whether you find differences between nonprofit and
for-profit hospitals depends on where you look. Most studies
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of hospital ownership have examined financial measures, and
have found little difference among hospital types. For example,
research has shown that nonprofit and for-profit hospitals are quite
similar in their costs, sources of capital, exercise of market power
and adoption of certain types of technology. Although for-profit
hospitals pay higher wages and offer incentives to top managers,
nonprofits are increasingly using performance-based pay as well.
Finally, during the early 1990s, for-profit hospitals and nonprofits
had similar margins, although for -profit margins were higher than
those of nonprofits by the late 1990s. There is some evidence that in
the most recent years the average nonprofit hospital had a negative
income per admission, while the average for-profit had a positive
income per admission.
Such financial measures, however, provide an incomplete picture
of a hospital. Because they are first and foremost providers of care
for the sick and injured, to evaluate whether nonprofit hospitals earn
their keep we must also know how hospitals differ in the medical care
they provide.
In my research on medical services, I have found large, systematic, and long-standing differences among hospital types. For-profit
hospitals are more likely than their nonprofit counterparts to offer
the most profitable services, and less likely than either nonprofits
or government hospitals to offer services that are unprofitable yet
valuable, even essential.
I will offer a few examples. Psychiatric emergency care is
considered an extremely unprofitable service, both because of
low reimbursements and because its patients tend to be poor and
uninsured. Comparing hospitals that are similar in terms of size,
teaching status, location, and market characteristics, for -profit
hospitals were seven percentage points less likely than nonprofits
and 15 percentage points less likely than government hospitals to
offer psychiatric emergency services.
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Compare these results to open heart surgery, a service so
profitable that it is often referred to as the hospital's "revenue
center." For-profit hospitals are over seven percentage points more
likely than similar nonprofit hospitals and 1 3 percentage points
more likely than government hospitals to provide open-heart
surgery.
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Perhaps what is most striking about for -profit hospitals is
how strongly and quickly they respond to changes in financial
incentives. The best illustration of this comes from a set of postacute care services, such as home health care and skilled nursing
services, whose profitability changed sharply over time . These
services became highly profitable in the early 1990s, then reversed
and became less profitable with the 1997 Balanced Budget Act. All
three types of hospitals increased their offerings of home health
care when it became profitable, but for -profits did so to a striking
degree. From 1988 to 1996, the probability of a for -profit hospital
offering home health services more than tripled - from 17. 5
percent to 60.9 percent. During the same period, nonprofit and
government hospitals increased their investment at a much lower
rate (nonprofits went from 40.9 to 51.7 percent, government

95

hospitals went from 38.1 to 51.9 percent). When these services
became unprofitable, for -profits were also quick to exit the
market, roughly five times quicker than nonprofits. This finding
provides evidence that for -profits move quickly and strongly in
response to financial incentives.
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In sum, for -profit and nonprofit hospitals act quite
differently. For-profit hospitals are considerably more responsive
to financial incentives than nonprofits, not just with respect to
their decisions to offer services but also in their willingness to
operate at all. Under financial pressure, for-profit hospitals are
more likely to close or restructure than nonprofits.
The most important aspect of these findings is that nonprofits
are more willing than for -profits to offer services even though
they happen to be unprofitable. These services include not
just psychiatric emergency care, but also child and adolescent
psychiatric care, AIDS treatment, alcohol and drug treatment,
emergency rooms, trauma services, and obstetric care.
There are a few clear implications of these findings for

the question of whether nonprofits provide valuable benefits
to society. First, if the mix of medical services available in a
community is strongly determined by the profitability of the
services, this is potentially worrisome for all patients - rich
and poor, insured and uninsured. Patients need what they need
depending on their medical condition, not on the price of a
service. Even rich and insured patients sometimes need services
that are unprofitable for hospitals to offer.
As I noted above, nonprofits are more likely to offer a trauma
center than for-profit hospitals with similar characteristics. One
hopes never to be in a serious car crash. But survivors are more
likely close to a trauma center if the accident takes place just
outside a nonprofit hospital.
Second, extreme responsiveness to financial incentives can be
quite costly to the government. Medicare spending per patient
and increases in spending rates are higher in for-profit hospital
markets than others. (See E. Silverman, J. Skinner, and E. Fisher,
"The Association Between For-Profit Hospital Ownership and
Increased Medicare Spending," New England Journal ef Medicine,
341, no. 6 (1999): 420.) This can be explained by investments
such as home health. For example, during that period of ramped
up provision of home health care services, home health visits per
Medicare beneficiary increased by nearly a factor of seven, and
payments for those services ballooned. Government spending
on post-acute care went from three percent of Medicare hospital
payments to 26 percent. This increase was not patients getting
better care, but hospitals double-dipping - receiving two reimbursements for the same treatment.
Perhaps more troubling is evidence that the relative responsiveness to financial incentives has led to fraudulent billing through
a practice known as "up-coding." Up-coding occurs when a
hospital shifts a patient's diagnosis to one that receives higher
reimbursement from Medicare. For example, a hospital may
label a case of pneumonia as a case of pneumonia with complica tions, at increased cost to the government of about $2,000 per
discharge. Although all types of hospitals have done this, for -profit
hospitals have done this more than nonprofit hospitals. (See E.
Silverman and J. Skinner, "Medicare Up-coding and Hospital
Ownership,"JournaJ efHealth Economics 23 [2004): 369-389.)
Moreover, up-coding is contagious. Nonprofit hospitals are more
likely to up -code when they have for -profit hospital neighbors
than when they do not .
As a final point on differences in hospital behavior, let me say a
word about charity care. Over the past 50 years, the legal require-
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ments for nonprofit hospitals seeking tax exemption have increasingly shifted from narrow requirements that hospitals relieve
poverty to broader demonstrations of charitable benefit. Yet,
public attention to the provision of what is called "charitable care"
has remained robust . Whether nonprofit and for -profit hospitals
differ in their provision of charity care is difficult to say - in
large part because what is typically measured is overall uncompensated care. Uncompensated care provided by hospitals represents items that most of us would not consider charitable. These
include bills left unpaid by patients who have the ability to pay
or discounts to insurance companies. Given these measurement
difficulties, credible evidence shows that hospital types do not
differ much in the provision of uncompensated care. Even these
results are hard to interpret because for-profit hospitals locate
in relatively better-insured areas. My main point in discussing
charity care is that although free care for those who are unable to
afford it is important, other differences - in services, in quality,
in medical innovation - are valuable to all members of society.

Hospital competition
Do nonprofit hospitals have anti-competitive effects, or
represent unfair competition to for -profits? The arguments
about competition boil down to the idea that the nonprofit tax
exemption is either unfair or distortionary. An older generation
of research claimed, for example, that the tax exemption gives
nonprofits an extra financial boost that makes it difficult for for profits to compete. Newer research has dismissed this notion by
demonstrating that income tax exemptions do not lower input
prices. Furthermore, as an empirical matter, if there were anticompetitive effects we would not see mixed markets with both
for-profit and nonprofit hospitals, but we do.
Some argue that nonprofits are less efficient than for-profits
and are able to stay in business because they use their surpluses,
including tax savings, to offset higher production costs . This idea,
too, has little foundation. In determining whether an organization is efficient, it is centrally important to answer the question
"efficient at what?" For-profits are more efficient at earning
profits. In the hospital sector, we care about efficiency in providing
health care. Overall, empirical evidence shows no appreciable
differences in efficiency at providing health care between for profit and nonprofit hospitals .
A final idea is that tax savings lead nonprofits to produce
too many goods of too little value . That is, nonprofits use their
financial savings to lower costs and, therefore, patients will buy

too much health care . This argument implies that the health care
provided by nonprofit hospitals is too cheap. The idea that health
care is too inexpensive is generally not of great concern, particularly when annual medical inflation rates are back on the rise at 4
percent per year.
The best evidence shows that nonprofit hospitals, rather than
using their financial savings to offset inefficient management
or lower prices to drive for-profit competitors out of business,
provide unprofitable and essential services that are valuable to
society. These come not only in the form of more valuable medical
services like trauma care, but also in training physicians and
nurses. It is the vigorous competition among nonprofit hospitals
that has produced virtually all the medical innovations on which
we rely. Imagine where we would be without the first smallpox
vaccination developed at the nonprofit Harvard Medical School or
the first brain surgery at Johns Hopkins. We can thank nonprofits
for robotic surgery, pacemakers, artificial skin, kidney transplants,
and new technology to save premature infants. Finally, along with
the competition among nonprofit hospitals, haYing for -profits in
the mix provides another dimension of competition, competition
between organizational types.
An important lesson of the research I have summarized today
is that what you find depends on where you look. If you look at
financial behavior, you will find few differences that justify tax
exemption. If you look at medical treatment, you will find some
striking differences of the sort that need to be included in any
thorough discussion of nonprofit benefits.
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